Political feasibility in energy and climate scenarios
A companion to the research article The politics of baselines · Fornborg (2026), published in ERSS
Energy and climate scenarios depend on assumptions about future policy. This example uses Swedish datacenters to show how public discontent, actor positions and societal trends shape the political feasibility of possible policy responses.
01 The policy question
Which rules for new Swedish datacenters could be adopted and sustained as electricity demand grows?
Sweden · Policy decisions in 2027–2030 · Follow to 2035
Announced operation by 2035.
Tracker · Stated 2035
Why the rules are contested
Datacenters attract investment and support AI ambitions. Their electricity demand can also raise household bills and delay industrial electrification when generation and grid capacity expand slowly.
Sources and map
The map shows projects with announced operation by 2035. Tracker snapshot: 10 October 2026.
TechSverige, 2026 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 SKGS, 2026The framework
Following Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), the framework combines an outside view with an inside view. The outside view identifies plausible policy trajectories through precedents, comparison and public debate.
The inside view compares their political feasibility across five dimensions drawn from political economy and socio-technical theory.
02 Look across places and time
The outside view uses precedents, public debate and actor commitments to identify plausible policy directions. Here, the survey follows disputes over new electricity demand, local benefits and who pays.
Across places
Ireland · Adopted policy and organised opposition · 2024–2026
Generation requirements and demands for a stop
Ireland requires new renewable generation covering 80% of annual demand, with a six-year transition. Friends of the Earth campaigns for a national moratorium and challenges the regulator’s policy, citing climate goals and household energy costs.
When does opposition seek tighter conditions, and when does it seek to halt expansion?
Spain · Government proposal · August 2026
A stricter matching rule
A draft decree proposes new renewable supply matched hourly for datacenters above 1 MW. It illustrates a different design from annual matching.
How does the rule change the commitments required of developers?
Sources
MITECO, 2026United States · Company pledge · March 2026
Commitments under political pressure
The White House pledge asks companies to secure new generation and protect other electricity customers from costs. The commitments are made by participating companies.
Could voluntary commitments develop without a national generation law?
Sources
The White House, 2026Sweden · Party, agency and business proposals · 2026
Who should finance new generation?
Party and agency proposals call for datacenters to finance new electricity generation. Business groups favour incentives, but SKGS warns about competition for industrial connections. The Social Democrats link generation requirements to lower electricity bills.
Should contracts remain voluntary, and which generation would qualify under a requirement?
Finland · Grid-operator consultation response · October 2026
What counts as additional?
Fingrid argues that transferring existing resources between contracts need not add capacity. Its response seeks clearer additionality rules.
What counts as new generation?
Sources
Fingrid, 2026Germany · Government bill · June 2026
Pressure to postpone a requirement
A government bill proposes moving full renewable annual matching from 2027 to 2030, citing investment conditions. The debate shows that implementation dates can change after a requirement has been introduced.
Can a requirement survive pressure to change its timetable?
Sources
Bundesregierung, 2026Across time
Cryptocurrency mining · Québec2018 → 2019 → 2023Power allocation changed when regional benefits came under scrutiny.
Large electricity requests prompted scrutiny of the industry’s economic benefits. A study commissioned by Hydro-Québec found few direct jobs relative to the power requested.
In 2019, a 300 MW allocation process ranked projects by jobs, payroll and investment per MW, plus heat recovery. Customers had to accept interruptions at peak demand. In 2023, the regulator suspended the remaining allocation process while the reserved capacity was reassessed.
Could disputes over regional benefits change the terms offered to a new electricity-intensive industry?
Onshore wind · Denmark2008 → 2009Compensation and local ownership became part of wind policy.
Wind development raised questions about property values, local ownership and who receives the benefits of new installations.
The 2008 renewable-energy law introduced property-value compensation and offers of local ownership shares. These provisions applied from 2009, subject to transition rules.
Who bears local losses from new electricity generation, and what compensation can help them adjust?
Bensinupproret · Sweden2019Household fuel costs became organised demands for lower taxes.
Bensinupproret organised motorists through social media and demonstrations, demanding lower fuel taxes. Participants stressed the cost of commuting and their dependence on cars outside cities. A parliamentary motion cited the movement in proposing a halt to further fuel-tax increases; Parliament rejected it.
When could household energy costs turn into organised demands to change policy?
SVT / TT, 2019 Lars Beckman (M) / Sveriges riksdag, 2019What emerges in Sweden?
Business interests can diverge
Datacenter investment and industrial electrification compete for connections. SKGS already raises this conflict.
Reform has advocates
Parties and energy companies propose generation requirements, with disagreement over which plants should qualify.
Costs can change political support
Higher household bills and delayed industrial projects can create pressure for stricter conditions on expansion.
Swedish actors, positions and sources
Incentives or a legal requirement?
Svenskt Näringsliv and SweDCI propose incentives for generation contracts. SKGS questions compulsory long-term contracts in the connection process, but also warns that datacenters may displace industrial projects. The business coalition can split as access to electricity becomes more contested.
Svenskt Näringsliv, 2026 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 SKGS, 2026Support for reform, different proposals
The Swedish Green Party calls for new renewable generation. The Social Democrats want datacenters to contribute electricity production, and EcoDataCenter supports additionality requirements. Svenska kraftnät proposes investigating fossil-free generation. Uniper wants nuclear power and lifetime extensions included.
Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 EcoDataCenter, 2026 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 Uniper, 2026Who gets electricity, and who pays?
SKGS warns that datacenters compete with industrial projects for power and grid connections. The Social Democrats link production commitments by datacenters to lower household electricity bills. Rising costs and delayed investments can increase pressure for conditions on expansion.
SKGS, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026Rule-keepers defend a policy, rule-switchers seek to change it, and rule-takers adapt without leading support or opposition. An actor’s role can change as costs, interests and alliances develop.
Swedish Parliament
Votes on national legislation.
The Green Party and Social Democrats together hold 121 of 349 seats. A broader parliamentary agreement is needed for their production proposals.
T1 and T2 require parliamentary approval.
Sveriges riksdag / SFS, 2026 Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Valmyndigheten, 2026Svenska kraftnät
Transmission-system operator; advises government and develops connection policy.
Proposes investigating generation requirements for major new electricity demand, considering fossil-free supply, timing and location.
Supports investigation of reform; its design is broader than annual renewable matching.
Svenska kraftnät, 2026 Svenska kraftnät, 2026Energy Markets Inspectorate (Ei)
Regulates electricity networks and reviews connection conditions.
Stresses non-discriminatory grid access and the risk that preferential AI arrangements displace other electricity users.
T1 assigns a new compliance role that legislation must establish.
Sveriges riksdag / SFS, 2026 Energimarknadsinspektionen, 2026EcoDataCenter
Invests in and operates datacenters; participates in energy-policy debate.
Calls for incentives and additionality requirements, while criticising connection conditions that conflict with its operating model.
Additionality requirements would make developers increase electricity supply.
EcoDataCenter, 2026Swedish Datacenter Industry (SweDCI)
Industry association; represents datacenter companies in policy discussions.
Seeks incentives, timetable guarantees and coordination. Describes long-term power purchase agreements as important for generation and location.
Its proposals favour negotiated investment arrangements.
Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025SKGS · energy-intensive industries
Represents forest, chemical, mining and steel industries.
Questions compulsory long-term power contracts, while warning that rapid datacenter growth competes with industry for power and grid connections.
Its defence of voluntary contracting may weaken if member firms’ own investments are displaced. This is a possible change in position over the scenario period.
Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 SKGS, 2026Swedish Green Party
Parliamentary party; 22 seats after the 2026 election.
Proposes requiring datacenters to invest in new renewable electricity production corresponding to their consumption.
The clearest party advocate for the renewable scope used in T1.
Miljöpartiet, 2026 Valmyndigheten, 2026Svenskt Näringsliv · business confederation
Coordinates business interests and seeks changes to national policy.
Proposes incentives for new-generation contracts, faster permits and connection charges that protect other customers from cost transfers.
Supports an incentive-led route; the proposed tariff changes are separate from the generation requirement.
Svenskt Näringsliv, 2026TechSverige
Tech-industry association; represents firms in digital and industrial policy.
Wants predictable investment conditions, faster electricity infrastructure and lower electricity tax. It accepts that tax relief may come with locally adapted sustainability conditions.
Supports sustainability conditions adapted to each location.
TechSverige, 2026Swedish Social Democratic Party
Parliamentary party; 99 seats after the 2026 election.
Its August 2026 election pledge calls for datacenters to contribute electricity production as part of reducing electricity bills.
Advocates production contributions within a broader fossil-free energy programme.
Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Valmyndigheten, 2026Uniper
Electricity producer and investor; can finance generation and negotiate supply contracts.
Proposes incentives for datacenter investment in generation. If matching requirements are imposed, it wants nuclear power and lifetime extensions to count.
A potential reform partner with a concrete objection to T1’s eligible-generation rules.
Uniper, 2026 Uniper, 2026Follow the conflict forward
AI investment, industrial decarbonisation and household living costs can pull policy in different directions. Follow how parties rank these goals, how public opinion develops and which affected groups organise. The same actors may support different rules at the next decision.
Evidence for these possible developments
Svenska kraftnät, 2026 SKGS, 2026 SVT / TT, 2019 Sveriges riksdag, 197403 Define comparable trajectories
The survey points to voluntary commitments, generation requirements and restrictions on new sites. These three alternatives apply those policy directions to new commercial datacenters in Sweden from 2030.
T0 · Continuation assumption
Voluntary generation commitments
Developers choose whether to secure new generation through investment or long-term power contracts.
From the outside viewSwedish business organisations favour voluntary contracts. The US company pledge illustrates commitments made under political pressure.
Policy design and sources
Swedish business organisations favour incentives and contracts. The US pledge shows how companies can also make voluntary generation commitments under political pressure.
No legislation establishing a sector requirement is adopted. Companies decide their procurement commitments.
A company signs a PPA for its own procurement goals. Another purchases from existing generation without a national requirement to add supply.
Sveriges riksdag / SFS, 2026 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Svenskt Näringsliv, 2026 The White House, 2026T1 · Specified reform scenario
Require new renewable generation
New sites must match annual electricity use with new renewable generation in Sweden, through investment or long-term power contracts.
From the outside viewSwedish reform proposals and Ireland’s generation requirement support testing this policy direction.
Policy design and sources
The Swedish Green Party proposes new renewable generation matching consumption. The PPA option comes from Svenska kraftnät’s discussion. The 2030 start, first-year compliance and detailed eligibility rules are specified here so that the reform can be assessed.
Government prepares legislation; Parliament establishes the requirement and Ei’s monitoring mandate.
A site opening in 2030 must secure matching new renewable annual generation and report compliance.
Svenska kraftnät, 2026 Commission for Regulation of Utilities, 2025 Miljöpartiet, 2026 MITECO, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026T2 · Moratorium scenario
Halt new establishments
No new commercial datacenter sites may open, including projects that offer new generation.
From the outside viewIrish campaigns for a moratorium and Québec’s allocation pauses support testing an establishment stop.
Policy design and sources
Campaigners in Ireland call for a nationwide moratorium. Earlier pauses in electricity allocation also appear in the historical survey. Here that policy direction is specified as a Swedish stop on new openings from 2030.
Government prepares a national restriction; Parliament establishes its legal basis, transition rules and enforcement. Authorities apply those rules in individual cases.
A proposed site cannot open even if it has secured new renewable generation.
Friends of the Earth Ireland, 2024 Friends of the Earth Ireland, 2026What the generation requirement covers
From the first full operating year, new renewable generation in Sweden must match 100% of each covered datacenter’s annual electricity demand. Developers invest directly or sign a long-term power purchase agreement (PPA). The generating plant must enter service after the investment or contract commitment and by the datacenter’s opening. The reform includes annual compliance reporting to the Energy Markets Inspectorate (Ei), with powers granted by the new legislation. Grid charges and connection priority remain as in T0.
The same prospective projects are assessed in all three alternatives: new commercial datacenter sites in Sweden that would open from 2030. Existing sites and their expansions fall outside this example.
Assess decisions in 2027–2030 and whether the resulting policy can be sustained to 2035. The dates are scenario choices. Political support can change within this period.
04 Compare political feasibility
Compare two policies across the five dimensions. The starting assessment uses the evidence available in October 2026 to judge their routes to adoption in 2027–2030.
Coalition alignmentWho can organise support or opposition? T0 / T1 · Voluntary / Requirement Business associations defend voluntary contracts. T1’s advocates include the Green Party, Social Democrats and developers supporting additional generation. T0 / T2 · Voluntary / Stop T0 starts with stronger organised support. T2 needs a new alliance willing to halt investment. T1 / T2 · Requirement / Stop T1 has identifiable reform advocates. A coalition for T2 would have to accept the loss of new establishments.
Identify interests, organisation and influence. Examine how an actor’s position could change as the policy’s effects become visible.
Voluntary commitments
Business groups favour incentives and voluntary contracts. That support can fracture: SKGS already warns that datacenters compete with industry for connections. If manufacturers face delays while datacenters connect, they gain a reason to seek tougher conditions. Household campaigns can make higher bills an electoral cost for parties defending continuation.
Generation requirement
The Swedish Green Party proposes a renewable-generation requirement. The Social Democrats call for datacenters to contribute electricity production; together the parties hold 121 of 349 seats. EcoDataCenter supports additionality requirements. Svenska kraftnät proposes investigating a broader fossil-free requirement. Uniper wants nuclear power and lifetime extensions included. The reform has advocates, but they differ over which generation should qualify.
Establishment stop
A stop could bring together electricity consumers, industrial users facing delays and opponents of resource-intensive expansion. Irish campaigners show how that demand can be organised. In Sweden, the mapped party proposals seek production contributions, while tech organisations seek expansion. A national stop therefore needs a much larger change in political alliances than T1.
Sources and research
Svenskt Näringsliv, 2026 SKGS, 2026 SVT / TT, 2019 Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Uniper, 2026 Valmyndigheten, 2026 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 EcoDataCenter, 2026 Breetz, Mildenberger & Stokes (2018) Monstadt & Saltzman (2025)Sources and research
Svenskt Näringsliv, 2026 TechSverige, 2026 SKGS, 2026 SVT / TT, 2019 Friends of the Earth Ireland, 2024 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Breetz, Mildenberger & Stokes (2018) Monstadt & Saltzman (2025)Institutional constraintsWhich rules and decision procedures matter? T0 / T1 · Voluntary / Requirement T0 fits existing rules. T1 requires legislation and a monitoring mandate for Ei. T0 / T2 · Voluntary / Stop T0 follows established procedures. T2 requires legislation, a public-interest justification and transition rules. T1 / T2 · Requirement / Stop Both require legislation. T2 faces the harder task of justifying a sector-wide restriction.
Trace the route from a political demand to a rule that authorities can apply. Distinguish formal legal constraints from political habits.
Voluntary commitments
Voluntary generation contracts fit the existing electricity-market framework. Continuing this arrangement requires no new sector legislation or compliance authority. Grid operators and the regulator retain their existing connection and supervision roles.
Generation requirement
In this legislative scenario, government must prepare a bill and Parliament must establish the requirement and give the Energy Markets Inspectorate (Ei) powers to monitor compliance. The bill must justify singling out new datacenters and define how the requirement relates to non-discriminatory grid access.
Establishment stop
Sweden protects freedom of trade and requires impartial administration. A national moratorium would need legislation justified by an important public interest, with rules for pending projects. Politicians cannot direct the outcome of individual administrative cases covered by constitutional independence. This makes T2 a substantial legislative change; protecting selected competitors alone is not a sufficient basis.
Sources and research
Sveriges riksdag / SFS, 2026 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 Energimarknadsinspektionen, 2026 Immergut (1992) Gilabert & Lawford-Smith (2012)Landscape pressuresHow could wider trends change political priorities? T0 / T1 · Voluntary / Requirement T0 fits the drive to attract AI investment. T1 also addresses concern over electricity prices and industrial electrification. T0 / T2 · Voluntary / Stop T0 fits current digital-investment ambitions. T2 gains relevance when limiting electricity demand becomes a political priority. T1 / T2 · Requirement / Stop T1 combines continued investment with new generation. T2 gains if opposition concerns the scale of expansion itself.
Landscape pressures concern macro-level change and public opinion: the AI investment race, industrial decarbonisation, energy-price shocks and changing views of who should benefit from scarce electricity. Assess how these developments could strengthen or weaken each trajectory over time.
Voluntary commitments
The AI investment race and digital sovereignty favour attracting new sites. But continued demand growth without sufficient generation brings a competing priority: affordable electricity for homes and industrial electrification. Svenska kraftnät describes this price and competitiveness risk. If it persists, the political appeal of accommodating every new project weakens.
Generation requirement
A generation requirement can accommodate AI investment while responding to industrial decarbonisation and concern over bills. Its political appeal grows if the wider debate shifts from attracting investment towards who supplies the electricity and who benefits. The Swedish party proposals already combine these priorities.
Establishment stop
A prolonged energy crisis, delayed industrial investment and a public view that expansion serves foreign firms at households’ expense could make a stop politically attractive. Irish campaigners express this resource-priority argument. In Sweden it would compete with the ambitions for AI capacity and digital sovereignty, which favour maintaining a route for new investment.
Sources and research
Regeringskansliet, 2026 TechSverige, 2026 Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 SKGS, 2026 SVT / TT, 2019 Monstadt & Saltzman (2025) Breetz, Mildenberger & Stokes (2018)Adjustment burdenWho loses, and can they adjust or be compensated? T0 / T1 · Voluntary / Requirement Under T0, households and other firms can face higher bills and delayed connections. T1 places generation costs and delivery risks on developers. T0 / T2 · Voluntary / Stop T2 reduces pressure from new demand, while concentrating losses on developers and prospective host communities. T1 / T2 · Requirement / Stop T1 offers developers a contractual route to open. T2 closes that route, increasing their incentive to oppose it.
Assess losses under continuation as well as reform. Include the capacity to absorb costs, secure compensation or turn those costs into political opposition.
Voluntary commitments
If new demand outpaces supply, households and industrial users face higher electricity bills. Firms can also lose years of investment returns while waiting for network capacity. Households can cut other spending or electricity use; firms can hedge, delay or relocate investment. SKGS represents industrial users in energy policy. Bensinupproret illustrates how household fuel costs can lead to organised demands for lower taxes.
Generation requirement
New datacenter developers must finance generation or commit to long-term payments under a PPA. The contract option avoids having to build and operate a power plant themselves. However, T1 requires the new plant to be ready when the datacenter opens: a delayed generation project can therefore delay the datacenter. Developers can respond by seeking exemptions, postponement or a different location. SweDCI’s demands for timetable guarantees show why this matters politically.
Establishment stop
Developers lose the option to open new sites; projects already in preparation face write-downs or relocation. Host municipalities lose expected investment and jobs. Firms with existing sites retain an expansion route under this example’s definition. Those uneven losses create pressure for exemptions, an earlier end date or compensation. Consumers avoid this cohort’s added demand, but that benefit must be weighed against the concentrated opposition.
Sources and research
Svenska kraftnät, 2026 SKGS, 2026 SVT / TT, 2019 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Commission for Regulation of Utilities, 2025 Carattini, Carvalho & Fankhauser (2018) Fairbrother, Johansson Sevä & Kulin (2019) Monstadt & Saltzman (2025)Sources and research
Svenska kraftnät, 2026 SKGS, 2026 TechSverige, 2026 Sveriges riksdag, 1974 SVT / TT, 2019 Carattini, Carvalho & Fankhauser (2018) Fairbrother, Johansson Sevä & Kulin (2019) Monstadt & Saltzman (2025)Sources and research
Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Commission for Regulation of Utilities, 2025 TechSverige, 2026 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 Sveriges riksdag, 1974 Carattini, Carvalho & Fankhauser (2018) Fairbrother, Johansson Sevä & Kulin (2019) Monstadt & Saltzman (2025)Policy momentumWhat do earlier policies and investments set in motion? T0 / T1 · Voluntary / Requirement T0 benefits from established practice. T1 builds on reform proposals and precedents for generation requirements. T0 / T2 · Voluntary / Stop T0 extends existing practice. T2 disrupts investment plans and creates pressure for exemptions. T1 / T2 · Requirement / Stop T1 develops existing proposals. T2 is a larger break with investment promotion and individual project decisions.
Previous policies establish routines, investments and expectations. Their effects can also create new interests that defend the policy or seek to reverse it.
Voluntary commitments
Contracting and established connection procedures make continuation easier initially. But momentum can turn: Sweden withdrew the datacenter electricity-tax concession in 2023. If further expansion raises bills or obstructs industrial investment, defending the existing policy becomes more costly and earlier supporters may seek reform.
Generation requirement
The question has moved into party programmes and Svenska kraftnät’s recommendations. Ireland has adopted an additional-renewable-electricity requirement, providing a practical precedent. Sweden would still need to establish its own compliance system. Germany’s proposal to postpone renewable matching shows how investment concerns can reopen a requirement’s timetable after adoption.
Establishment stop
A national stop departs sharply from investment promotion and case-by-case administration. Firms and municipalities already preparing projects have reasons to resist it. If adopted, the stop could build support among users who benefit from reduced demand, while developers press for exceptions or reopening. Holding it until 2035 is a separate political task from passing it.
Sources and research
Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Regeringen och Riksrevisionen, 2022 Riksrevisionen / Sveriges riksdag, 2026 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Bundesregierung, 2026 SKGS, 2026 SVT / TT, 2019 Commission for Regulation of Utilities, 2025 Hedeler, Hellsmark & Söderholm (2023) Breetz, Mildenberger & Stokes (2018)Sources and research
Regeringskansliet, 2026 TechSverige, 2026 Sveriges riksdag, 1974 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 SKGS, 2026 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Regeringen och Riksrevisionen, 2022 Riksrevisionen / Sveriges riksdag, 2026 SVT / TT, 2019 Hedeler, Hellsmark & Söderholm (2023) Breetz, Mildenberger & Stokes (2018)Sources and research
Svenska kraftnät, 2026 Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 TechSverige, 2026 Sveriges riksdag, 1974 Commission for Regulation of Utilities, 2025 Bundesregierung, 2026 Regeringskansliet, 2026 Hedeler, Hellsmark & Söderholm (2023) Breetz, Mildenberger & Stokes (2018)Starting assessment · Evidence to October 2026
T0 has the stronger starting position. T1 has reform advocates, but needs a parliamentary majority and agreement on which generation qualifies.
Starting assessment · Evidence to October 2026
T0 has stronger organised support and follows established procedures. T2 requires a coalition willing to halt new establishments and defend that restriction.
Starting assessment · Evidence to October 2026
T1 has a clearer route to reform: it permits investment subject to a generation requirement. T2 needs broader acceptance of the losses from stopping new sites.
Pairwise comparison: Fornborg (2026), §4.5, drawing on Carlson and Montgomery (2017).
Before the decision · 2027–2029
How do the assumptions affect the comparison?
Start with constrained generation and grid expansion. Test how greater capacity availability changes the policy comparison.
Explore the assumptions
Constrained expansion · baseline
Generation and grid capacity expand slowly relative to new demand during 2027–2029.
Political support · T0 / T1 Higher bills give household groups more reason to join T1’s advocates. Industrial support depends on whether the requirement also helps with connection delays.
Political support · T0 / T2 Higher bills and connection delays give households and industry more reason to seek a stop. Project losses give developers and host communities reasons to oppose it.
Political support · T1 / T2 Unresolved connection queues give industrial users more reason to consider T2, even when T1 promises new generation.
Expanded capacity · counterfactual
More generation and grid capacity are available when new loads connect during 2027–2029.
Political support · T0 / T1 Lower price pressure and fewer connection conflicts give households and industry less reason to join T1’s advocates.
Political support · T0 / T2 A stop offers less relief to households and industry. Project losses still give developers and host communities reasons to oppose it.
Political support · T1 / T2 More capacity weakens the case for T2 among competing electricity users. T1 retains its existing reform advocates.
Explore possible coalitions
Documented supportPossible alignment
T0Voluntary commitments
- Business associations
Support voluntary contracts.
Documented support.
T1Generation requirement
- Parties and developers
The Green Party, Social Democrats and some developers support a requirement.
Documented support. - Household groups
Higher bills give them a reason to join the demand for new generation.
Possible alignment under this assumption. - Industrial electricity users
Price relief can attract support; unresolved local queues can keep them from joining.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T0Voluntary commitments
- Business associations
Support voluntary contracts.
Documented support. - Developers and host communities
Lost projects give them a reason to oppose a stop.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T2Establishment stop
- Household groups
Higher bills can turn into demands to limit new electricity use.
Possible alignment under this assumption. - Industrial electricity users
Persistent connection queues can make a stop more attractive.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T1Generation requirement
- Parties and developers
The Green Party, Social Democrats and some developers support a requirement.
Documented support. - Developers planning new sites
A generation requirement preserves a route to opening new sites.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T2Establishment stop
- Household groups
Higher bills can turn into demands to limit new electricity use.
Possible alignment under this assumption. - Industrial electricity users
Persistent connection queues can make a stop more attractive.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T0Voluntary commitments
- Business associations
Support voluntary contracts.
Documented support.
T1Generation requirement
- Parties and developers
The Green Party, Social Democrats and some developers support a requirement.
Documented support. - Household groups
Lower price pressure gives them less reason to join the reform coalition.
Possible alignment under this assumption. - Industrial electricity users
Fewer price and connection conflicts weaken their incentive to seek a requirement.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T0Voluntary commitments
- Business associations
Support voluntary contracts.
Documented support. - Developers and host communities
Lost projects give them a reason to oppose a stop.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T2Establishment stop
- Household groups
A stop offers less relief when electricity-price pressure is lower.
Possible alignment under this assumption. - Industrial electricity users
Fewer connection conflicts weaken their reason to seek a stop.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T1Generation requirement
- Parties and developers
The Green Party, Social Democrats and some developers support a requirement.
Documented support. - Developers planning new sites
A generation requirement preserves a route to opening new sites.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
T2Establishment stop
- Household groups
A stop offers less relief when electricity-price pressure is lower.
Possible alignment under this assumption. - Industrial electricity users
Fewer connection conflicts weaken their reason to seek a stop.
Possible alignment under this assumption.
Constrained expansion · baseline
- Electricity prices
- Limited generation and transmission capacity increases upward pressure on regional electricity prices as new demand connects.
- Connections
- Limited grid capacity intensifies competition for connections between datacenters and industrial electrification.
T0 / T1 · Voluntary / Requirement · Adoption by 2030
T0 retains a narrower advantage over T1
Higher bills and industrial delays strengthen the case for T1 and give its advocates potential allies. T0 remains more feasible for the 2030 decision because it has organised business support and uses existing rules. T1 becomes the main challenge to continuation as electricity costs compete with AI investment for political priority.
Reasoning across the five dimensions
- Coalition alignment
- Higher bills give household groups a reason to join T1’s advocates. Industrial users facing queues have a weaker reason to back this particular requirement when the promised generation leaves their connection delayed. This divides the potential reform coalition along price and connection interests.
- Institutional constraints
- T1 still requires legislation, eligible-generation rules and a monitoring mandate. Stronger demands for action can help it reach the agenda, but national production and local grid access involve different decisions.
- Landscape pressures
- Higher living costs and industrial delays increase the political cost of prioritising AI investment. T1 offers parties a way to respond to affordability and industrial decarbonisation while allowing new sites. This strengthens its case relative to T0.
- Adjustment burden
- Under T0, higher electricity costs fall on households and firms, while connection delays hold back industrial investment. T1 places generation costs and delivery risks on developers. Its relief for users waiting for connections is smaller where local grid capacity remains scarce.
- Policy momentum
- Existing voluntary contracts and project plans support T0. Continued scarcity can undermine confidence in that approach, while generation-requirement proposals give T1 an established route into debate.
T0 / T2 · Voluntary / Stop · Adoption by 2030
T0 remains more feasible than a national stop
Scarcity gives households and industrial users stronger reasons to seek limits on new demand. T0 retains the advantage through established procedures and investment commitments. T2 faces concentrated opposition from developers and prospective host communities, alongside the larger legislative task of justifying a sector-wide stop.
Reasoning across the five dimensions
- Coalition alignment
- Industry associations and household campaigns have stronger reasons to seek limits on new demand. T2 would concentrate losses on developers and host communities, giving them a common reason to oppose a stop. T0 retains the more established coalition.
- Institutional constraints
- Electricity scarcity strengthens the public-interest argument for intervention. T2 still needs a justified sector-wide restriction, transition rules and a parliamentary route.
- Landscape pressures
- Scarcity puts AI investment in sharper conflict with industrial decarbonisation and household purchasing power. That makes limiting new demand more politically attractive and weakens the wider case for unrestricted expansion under T0.
- Adjustment burden
- T2 offers electricity users relief from competing demand, while concentrating project losses on developers and host communities. Those concentrated losses favour organised resistance to a stop. Household support for T2 would require mobilising more dispersed gains from lower bills.
- Policy momentum
- Committed investments create resistance to a stop. Unresolved shortages can weaken the promise of benefits used to defend further development.
T1 / T2 · Requirement / Stop · Adoption by 2030
T1 remains the more feasible reform
T1 has reform advocates and allows new establishments alongside additional generation. Persistent connection shortages strengthen the case for T2 among competing grid users, since national generation requirements can leave local queues unresolved. T1’s existing political support and lower losses for developers still give it the clearer route to adoption.
Reasoning across the five dimensions
- Coalition alignment
- T1 already has party and developer advocates. T2 can attract groups facing persistent local scarcity, but needs their agreement to forgo new establishments.
- Institutional constraints
- Both require new legislation. T1 can condition continued investment; T2 needs the broader justification for prohibiting new sites.
- Landscape pressures
- T1 can reconcile additional supply with digital investment. T2 becomes politically more relevant where opposition concerns resource allocation or the scale of expansion.
- Adjustment burden
- T1 gives developers a route to open through generation commitments. T2 removes that route; users still facing local scarcity may judge its relief worth the project losses.
- Policy momentum
- T1 develops proposals already under discussion. T2 departs further from investment promotion, but repeated unresolved allocation conflicts can increase pressure for that break.
Evidence used in this comparison
Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 SKGS, 2026 Friends of the Earth Ireland, 2024 SVT / TT, 2019 Lars Beckman (M) / Sveriges riksdag, 2019 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Regeringskansliet, 2026 Svenskt Näringsliv, 2026 TechSverige, 2026Expanded capacity · counterfactual
- Electricity prices
- Additional generation and transmission capacity reduces the upward pressure on regional electricity prices from new demand.
- Connections
- Additional grid capacity eases competition for connections and local network bottlenecks.
T0 / T1 · Voluntary / Requirement · Adoption by 2030
T0’s advantage over T1 strengthens
More generation and grid capacity reduce the losses that could bring households and industrial users into a coalition for T1. T0’s established procedures and organised support weigh more heavily as those conflicts ease. T1 retains reform advocates and climate arguments, with less pressure for a decision by 2030.
Reasoning across the five dimensions
- Coalition alignment
- Lower exposure to price and connection pressures gives T1’s advocates less opportunity to recruit households and industrial users. Business support for voluntary contracts faces fewer immediate conflicts.
- Institutional constraints
- T0 fits current procedures. T1 requires legislation, rules for eligible generation and a monitoring mandate. Additional capacity leaves that institutional advantage for T0 in place.
- Landscape pressures
- AI investment and industrial decarbonisation face less immediate conflict over electricity. Climate commitments and public opinion can still support a generation requirement.
- Adjustment burden
- Reduced electricity pressures lower the immediate burden on other users under T0. T1 still imposes procurement costs and delivery risks on developers.
- Policy momentum
- Voluntary contracts and grid projects that deliver their expected benefits strengthen T0. Existing reform proposals keep T1 available for parties prioritising additionality.
T0 / T2 · Voluntary / Stop · Adoption by 2030
T0 has a clearer advantage over a national stop
A stop offers less relief to electricity users when capacity is more available. T0 retains business support and established procedures, while T2 still imposes project losses and requires a national restriction. Local land-use opposition provides a weaker basis for a nationwide coalition than widespread price and connection conflicts.
Reasoning across the five dimensions
- Coalition alignment
- T0 retains established business support. T2 needs allies willing to halt investment despite reduced electricity pressures.
- Institutional constraints
- T0 benefits from established procedures. A national stop requires justification despite reduced supply and connection pressures.
- Landscape pressures
- Lower electricity pressures give investment promotion fewer immediate trade-offs with household bills and industry. Land use and other public priorities remain relevant to opposition.
- Adjustment burden
- T2 concentrates losses on developers and host communities while offering electricity users less immediate relief. Local environmental benefits may still matter.
- Policy momentum
- Completed investment and reinforcement strengthen expectations of continued development. T2 breaks more sharply with those plans.
T1 / T2 · Requirement / Stop · Adoption by 2030
T1 retains the stronger case for reform
T1 can draw on existing proposals to combine new investment with climate commitments. T2 requires supporters to accept the loss of new establishments while offering less relief from electricity constraints. The balance of coalition support, adjustment costs and institutional requirements continues to favour T1.
Reasoning across the five dimensions
- Coalition alignment
- T1 retains identifiable reform advocates. T2 still requires a coalition willing to accept the loss of new establishments.
- Institutional constraints
- T1 still requires a new legal framework. T2 faces the larger task of justifying a prohibition on new sites.
- Landscape pressures
- T1 can still connect new investment with climate commitments. T2 needs a stronger shift towards limiting expansion than these electricity assumptions alone imply.
- Adjustment burden
- Developers can comply and open under T1; T2 prevents that investment. Lower electricity pressures weaken the case for asking these groups to accept the larger loss.
- Policy momentum
- T1 builds on generation requirements already proposed. T2 conflicts more directly with established investment plans and promotion.
Evidence used in this comparison
Miljöpartiet, 2026 Socialdemokraterna, 2026 Svenska kraftnät, 2026 SKGS, 2026 Friends of the Earth Ireland, 2024 SVT / TT, 2019 Lars Beckman (M) / Sveriges riksdag, 2019 Svenska kraftnät; presentationer från flera namngivna organisationer, 2025 Regeringskansliet, 2026 Svenskt Näringsliv, 2026 TechSverige, 202605 Bring the assessment into the scenario
Use the feasibility comparison to choose a reference policy and the alternatives to examine alongside it.
An unchanged policy assumption
Voluntary generation commitments continue unchanged to 2035.
Constrained expansion · baseline
Test a generation requirement alongside continuation
- T0 · Reference policy
- Use continuation as the reference: T0 has the stronger route to adoption by 2030.
- T1 · Main reform to examine
- Compare a generation requirement with T0 as higher bills and industrial delays strengthen demands for reform.
- T2 · Separate alternative
- Examine the consequences of halting new sites, the least feasible of the three alternatives.
Expanded capacity · counterfactual
Continuation has the stronger political basis
- T0 · Reference policy
- Use continuation as the reference; its political basis strengthens as price and connection conflicts ease.
- T1 · Reform alternative
- Retain the generation requirement for comparison: it still has advocates and climate arguments.
- T2 · Separate alternative
- A stop remains the least feasible alternative and offers less relief to other electricity users.
Policy rules in the model
Voluntary commitments continue through 2029. From 2030, compare continuation, a generation requirement and an establishment stop.
- T0 · Voluntary commitments
- No statutory generation requirement. Represent voluntary investment and power contracts as company choices.
- T1 · Generation requirement
- From 2030, new sites must secure new renewable generation in Sweden matching 100% of annual demand, through investment or a long-term power contract.
- T2 · Establishment stop
- Set new commercial site openings to zero from 2030. Track postponed or relocated projects. Existing sites and expansions remain outside the stop.
Use the model’s regional prices, connection delays and investment costs to identify who gains or loses under each policy. Reassess their political responses at the next decision window.
Revisit the assumptions ↑